## For the Northern District of California

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5	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
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7	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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9	9 ANNETTE HORNSBY,	Io. C 10-04928 JSW
10	O Plaintiff,	HIRD ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
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12	2 LITTON LOAN SERVICING, ET AL.,	
13	3 Defendants.	
14	4	

The Court is in receipt of Plaintiff Annette Hornsby's motion to file a second amended complaint ("SAC") and her response to this Court's Second Order to Show Cause. A motion to file leave to amend is a noticed motion which must be filed in accordance with Northern District Local Civil Rule 7, including the requirement to notice the motion for a hearing at least thirty-five days after service of the motion. Moreover, upon review of Plaintiff's proposed SAC, it appears as though federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

Federal courts are under a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). If the Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must dismiss the case. *Id.*; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts can only adjudicate cases which the Constitution or Congress authorize them to adjudicate: those cases involving diversity of citizenship (where the parties are from diverse states), or a federal question, or those cases to which the United States is a

party. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil cases and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. *Id.* at 377. The United States is not a party to this case. Although Plaintiff has not alleged the citizenship of each of the parties, it appears evident from the fact of her complaints that she is a resident of California and that some, if not all, of the Defendants would be California citizens. Thus, complete diversity does not exist.

Additionally, having reviewed the facts alleged in the second amended complaint, it appears as though Plaintiff's only federal claim is time barred. Without a valid federal claim, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff clarifies that her claims stem from a loan that she obtained in December of 2003. Plaintiff's only federal claim is one under the Real Estate Procedures Settlement Act ("RESPA"). It is unclear which provision of RESPA Plaintiffs contend Defendants violated. RESPA is governed by a one or three year statute of limitations, depending on the alleged violation, that commences on the date the alleged violation occurred. *See* 12 U.S.C. § 2614. However, because Plaintiff's RESPA claim pertains to actions that occurred in December of 2003, when Plaintiff signed the loan documents, Plaintiff's RESPA claim is time-barred regardless of what provision of RESPA Plaintiff contends Defendants violated.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question of whether equitable tolling is available under RESPA, several district courts have determined that equitable tolling is available. *See Rosal v. First Fed. Bank of Cal.*, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Assuming that equitable tolling applies to the RESPA claim, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would demonstrate why she did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover the alleged violations within the limitations period. *See Pineda v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA*, 2011 WL 249486, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (declining to toll the limitations period for the plaintiffs' RESPA claim because they failed to provide facts to support the conclusion that "the facts surrounding this loan transaction were purposefully hidden and continue to be hidden from them").

Therefore, Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE ("OSC") in writing, by **July 22, 2011**, why this action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Plaintiff shall address what facts, if any, she could allege that would support tolling the statute of

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

limitations on her RESPA claim. If Plaintiff can demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction, the		
Court will set her motion for leave to amend for a hearing. Plaintiff is admonished that her failure to		
respond this Order by July 22, 2011, will result in a dismissal of this action for lack of subject		
matter jurisdiction.		

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2011

JEFFREY'S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 FOR THE 3 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 ANNETTE HORNSBY, Case Number: CV10-04928 JSW 6 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 7 8 LITTON LOAN SERVICING et al, 9 Defendant. 10 11 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on June 24, 2011, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 15 16 Annette Hornsby 17 2319 Benington Drive Vallejo, CA 94591 18 19 nnuer Ottolini Dated: June 24, 2011 20 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk 21 22 23 24 25 26 27